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on and so forth. Here, as under all of our preceding heads,
the illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely without
materially strengthening the moral, which is that a "chaos
of thought and passion all confused" has inspired the enactment of Sunday laws, stimulates their enforcement, and
manifests itself in every judicial attempt to either justify,.
explain or apply them.
Baltimore, Mid., October2o, z892.
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Constructive Trusts-Trustee Purchasing Trust Properly at Sherifs "
Sale- Withholding Information from cestui que trust.
When property of a cestui que trust is taken from the control of the
trustee and sold at sheriffs sale, the trustee is not incapacitated by hisfiduciary position to become the purchaser.
But the sheriffs seizuredoes not release the trustee from his character, and his right to purchasedepends on the discharge of his full duty as trustee, which includes the
communication of any information which may possibly be utilized by thecestui que trust.

On appeal from a decree for plaintiff upon a bill filed
to have a certain piece of real estate declared to belong to,
a trust estate.
From the findings of the master the following facts.
appeared:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In 1874, R. . Simpson and wife, by deed duly executed, constituted Patrick Doyle trustee of certain real
1 Reported in Ad. Reps. Leg. Int. Supplement, Vol. XLIX, p. 38,•
March 14, 1892.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

estate, including the property in question. In 1879, the
mortgagee, who held a mortgage of $4o,ooo against it,
foreclosed and sold the property. Just before the sale,
-vhich was entirely hostile to and beyond the control of the
-trustee Doyle, the trustee weit to counsel of the mortgagee
and asked for time. Counsel replied that the mortgagee
did not wish to own the property, that if somebody would
-come forward within a very limited time and pay up all
that was necessary (including counsel fee) to cut down the
incumbrance to the principal of the mortgage ($40,000),
the mortgagee, counsel felt sure, would be glad to have
such person take the property off their hands. There was
no agreement of any sort other than this. The mortgagee
bought in the property, and afterward Doyle, the trustee,
-raised sufficient money to pay the mortgagee all the money
,due down to the $40,000 mortgage, and took title from the
-mortgagee's agent in the name of one John L Green, who
gave a purchase money mortgage for $40,000. A declaration of trust by Green in favor of Simpson had been drawn,
but did not appear to have been executed. There was an
executed declaration of trust by Green in favor *of Doyle.
Simpson knew nothing of this until after suit, nor did he
'know of the negotiation between the trustee Doyle and the
counsel for the mortgagee. He believed, however, that
Green held the title, and that the property would come
back to himself after the debts were paid. This was what
his counsel, O'Bryne, had told him in Doyle's presence.
The bill, filed in 1885, alleged inter alia, (8) that the
sale of 1879 had been procured by Doyle upon an express
a reement to purchase the property with funds of the trust
estate, or upon the security of the title, and to reconvey to
the trust estate as soon as the advances were repaid.
There was. also the further allegation (9) that Doyle was
'under a legal incapacity to deal with the title to be produced at the sherift's sale, because he was the actual trustee
of the title divested by the sale.
A final account, filed by Doyle in March, 1885, was
the first notice to Simpson that the title was held adversely
to the trust.
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The master recommended a decree of conveyance byGreen, and charged Doyle with rent since the sheriff's sale,
and refused to allow credits for commissions paid for collecting rent. Exceptions were filed by appellants, which
were dismissed, and a decree entered by the Court.'
I The assignments of errorspecified, that the Court erred

(I) in holding that the failure to communicate to the ceslui
,que trust the statement of mortgagee's counsel, recite4
above, rendered the purchase invalid; (7) in decreeing a
conveyance; (8) in charging Doyle with rents received since
the sheriff's sale, and refusing to allow him credit for commissions paid real estate agent for collecting rents; and (9)
in not dismissing the bill.
FrankP. Prichardand Samuel Gustine Thomjfson, for
appellants. Robert H. Neilson and Geo. Tucker Bispham,

for appellee.
ABSTRACTS FROM OPINION.

MITCHELL,

J. Though there was no express agree-

ment to purchase for the trust, there is evidence satisfactory
to the master and the Court below that Simpson believed
such was to be the case, and that the conduct of Doyle
aided in producing that belief. The master finds expressly
that Simpson was told by O'Byrne in Doyle's presence that
Green would take the title as trustee, that a declaration of
trust by Green in favor of Simpson's wife and family was
prepared by counsel, and Simpson supposed it was executed,
that the declaration of trust for Doyle was not put on
record, that Simpson did not know of it until it was produced before the examiner in this suit, and that the first
adverse act of Doyle to put Simpson upon notice and inquiry was the failure to include the rents of the property
in the account filed in 1885. But aside from, and in addition to all this, the undisputed fact is, that Doyle did not
communicate to his cestui que trust the terms upon which
'the property could be regained after the sale. While it is.
clear that no agreement was made by the counsel for the
mortgagee, it is equally clear that he expressed a belief as.
' See opinion of Pennypacker, J., 47 Leg. Int., 48.
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to his client's willingness to make certain terms which
proved to be correct, and was subsequently carried out by
his client. This option, prospect, opportunity, whatever
it ma3i be called, however far short of an agreement, was
still an advantage to which the cestui que trust was entitled.
It practically gave the party who knew of it a chance to
become the purchaser on a credit of forty thousand dollars
to be left in mortgage on the property, and on a cash outlay of only eight or nine thousand, while outside bidders
were, so far as they knew, required to purchase for cash in
full. Of this chance Doyle took advantage. It may be
that even with knowledge of it Simpson could not have
profited by it. But, according to the master's report, there
was still some other trust property which might possibly
have been sold or mortgaged for enough to save this, or in
other ways he might have raised the money necessary.
Whether he could or not is unimportant, he was entitled to
an opportunity to try.' The withholding of such opportunity was a failure of his full duty as trustee, that, irrespective of intent and of any actual fraud, prevented Doyle
from acquiring the title for himself as against his cestui
que trust.
Decree affirmed at cost of appellants.
PtRCHASES BY TRUSTEES AT SALES UNDER ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS.

The well-known Rumford Market case (1726) enunciated a principle adopted by courts of equity
for the purpose of eliminating from
the fiduciary relation the element
of selfishness, and, therefore, the
object of strong and bitter assault.
Briefly stated, it is that a trustee or
other fiduciary shall enter into no
transaction affecting the subject
matter of the trust whereby he may
be personally benefited. The observance of this principle is secured
by means of the doctrine of constructive trusts, whereby the estate
of the cestui que trust derives all
the advantage (Robbins v. Butler,

24 fI., 432; Herrick v. Miller, r23
Ind., 304; Denholm v. McKay, r48
Mass., 434; Heager's Ex'rs (Pa)
15 S. & R., 16; Green v. Sargent,
The cases in which
23 Vt., 466).
its application has been invoked
may so far as purchasing the property is concerned, and for convenience of treatment, be grouped under three heads.
(I) Where the trustee purchases
the property which forms the subject of the trust directly from his
cestui que trust.
(2) Where the trustee purchases
at a sale made in the interests of
the estate, either by himself in vir-
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tue of a power to do so or by order
of a court of equity and under its
supervision.
(3)Where the trustee purchases
at a sale made in the interests and
under the control of those who are
seeking the satisfaction of their
claims, which may be called a sale
under adversary proceedings.
In all of the above cases equity
protects the interests of the cestuis
que trustent by considering that
the trustee has acted for the benefit
of the estate.
(a) Of the first class it is only
necessary to say a word, since the
rule laid down in the leading case
of Fox v. Mackreth, (4 Bro. P. C.,
258; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 1.5) decided
in 1788, has since been invariably
followed: a trustee cannot purchase
from his cestui que trust unless it
satisfactorily appears to the Court
that the connection between them
has been dissolved and that all
knowledge" of the value of the
property acquired by the trustee
has beer communicated to his vendor. In Cowee v. Cornell, a case
wherein undue influence was
charged, the Court, after stating
that fraud was not generally to be
presumed, delivered this very comprehensive statement of the rule
under consideration: "Wherever
the relation between the contracting parties appears to be of such a
character as to render it certain
that they do not deal on terms of
equality, but that either on the one
side, from superior knowledge of
the matter derived from a fiduciary
relation or from overmastering influence, or on the other, from weakness, dependence or trust justifiably
reposed, unfair advantage in a
transaction is rendered probable,
there the transaction is presumed
void-and it is incumbent upon the

stronger party to show affirmatively
that all was open, fair and well
understood" (75 N. Y., 91; see also
Brown v. Cowell, ir6 Mass., 461;
McClure v. Lewis, 72 Mo., 315;
Waldrop v. Leaman, 30 S. C., 428;
Wright v. Campbell, 27 Ark., 637).
In this class of cases it will be
observed that equity deals with the
transaction on the theory of constructive fraud rather than of constructive trusts and the validity of
the purchase rests on the ability of
the trustee to rebut the, presumption thus cast upon it.
(b) Cases in the second class are
governed by a different rule.
"A trustee purchasing the trust
property is liable to have the purchase set aside if within a reasonable time the cestui que trust
chooses to say he is dissatisfied
with it " (Campbell v. Walker, 5
Ves.,678, 63o). Both of these rules
seek to protect the interests of the
cestui que trust and the difference
grows out of the fact that in the
second class of cases the consent of the cestui que trust to
the transaction has been neither
sought nor given. Where they contract together the cestui que trust
of course consents, and the Chancellor can only insist that the reality of that consent be established.
Where, however, the trustee acts
without even the knowledge of the
cestui que trust the latter, when he
discovers the purchaser, is in the
position of being approached for
his consent and he is then at liberty
to actively dissent and thus invalidate the whole transaction.
In some of the early cases reliance was placed by counsel on a
qualification of the old Roman rule
tutor rem pupilliemere non botest,
to the effect that the validity of his
purchase at public auction could
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not be questioned provided the
trustee brought fpalam et bonafide
and notper interpositampersonam.
But Lord ELDoN demonstrated
that the manner of the purchase
was of no importance, nor was even
the question of profit an element
for consideration, since the object
of the rule was to ')revent fraud
which might be perpetrated and
which could so easily be concealed.
It is certain that the position of the
trustee gives him a coign of vantage. He has full opportunity, indeed it is his business to acquire a
complete knowledge of the value
and circumstances of the property
which he administers for another.
He might in a given case resist the
temptation to use this for his own
benefit; but to secure the cestui que
trustthe rule must needs admit of
no relaxation. "If the trustee can
buy in an honest case he may in a
case having .that appearance, but
which from the infirmity of human
testimony may be grossly otherwise" (Expfiarte Bennett, io Ves.,
385). The Court, therefore, very
wisely refrains from any inquiry
into the transaction itself.
In this country the general rule
has received almost universal approval and sanction.
Of purchases made by the trustee at his own sale the leading case
of Davoue v. Fanning is a good example. An executor with power
to sell for the payment of legacies
exposed the property of his testator for sale at public auction, and
by previous arrangement it was
purchased for his wife, who was
also beneficially interested in the
proceeds. The sale was bona fide
and for a fair price, but upon a bill
filed by another beneficiary under
the will Chancellor KSNT ordered
48

a resale of the property on the
ground that as the executor's interest interfered with his duty the
case fell within the rule, that if a
trustee acting for others sells an
estate and becomes himself interested in the purchase the cestui que
trust is entitled as a matter of
course to have that purchase set
aside (Johns. Ch., 252; see also
Dyer v. Shurtleff, 112 Mass., i65;
Lewis v. Welch, 47 Minn., 193;
Chandler v. Moulton, 33 Vt., 245;
McNeil v. Gates, 41 Ark., 264;
Roberts v. Roberts, 65 N. C., 27;
Jamison v. Glasscock, 29 Mo., 191).
Purchases at a public sale, judicially ordered and conducted, are
governed by the same rule. An
executor, in Louisiana, purchased
the property of his testator at a
public sale, ordered by a judge of a
Probate Court upon his petition.
He attempted to sustain the validity
of his purchase on the ground that
the sale was under the supervision
of a court of equity, and there could
be no opportunity to commit a
fraud. The Court was of opinion
that any inquiry into the facts of
the case, with a view to establish
the trustee's honesty, was unnecessary, since the executor was clearly
within the rule which was framed
to dispense with just such an investigation (Michoud v. Girod, 4
How., 503; James v. James, 55 Ala.,
525; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 45 Ohio,
512;

Mercer v. Newsom,

23

Ga.;

Hoit v. Webb, 36 N. H., I58).
Nor is a trustee allowed.to purchase for others. The rule aims to
prevent him from using to the prejudice of the cestui que trust, any
information which it is his duty to
acquire, and it is too delicate to
hold that he will not be tempted to
so use it if allowed to bid for an-

746

PURCHASES BY TRUSTEES

other. (The distinction is too thin
to form a safe rule of justice, per
Lord Eldon in ExparteBennet, io
Yes., 385; also Piatt v. Longworth,
27 Ohio, I59; Davoue v. Fanning,
2 Johns, Ch., 252.)
Tennessee, however, while sanctioning the application of the rule
to trustees, purchasing at their own
sales, has made an exception of the
case of a purchase at a sale judicially ordered and conducted. The
question arose in a case wherein a
subsequent purchaser, from a guardian who had purchased the property of his wards at a sale ordered
and conducted by a court of equity,
upon an application for a partition
resisted the enforcement of his contract on the.ground that the guardian's title was invalid. The Court,
however, laid down the rule which
has never been deviated from that
the guardian may purchase the
property of his ward sold under an
order of a court of competent jurisdiction for his benefit, and, if it be
manifest that he has acted fairly
with the utmost good faith and the
transaction is fiee from any imputation of a design on his part to,
gain a benefit to himself to the prejudice of the interest of his ward,
such a purchase is valid (Blackmore v. Shelby, 8 Hump., 439). As
will be noticed, the objection here
did not come from the cesiui que
trnst, and the Court, in its remarks,
-exceeded the necessities of the case.
:Butthe exception has become established (Ex arte Crump, 16 Lea,
732).
The case of a guardian purchasIng t a judicial sale for the benefit
of the ward, is clearly within the
spirit of the maxim, emptor emit
guam minimopotest vendor vendit
quam maximo potest, which does
.not suffer any person to purchase

property for himself who is at all
interested on behalf of others in
preventing a depreciation of the
amount for which it may be sold.
And to rest the disqualification of
the guardian as a purchaser solely
on the evil influence which he may
exert over the conduct of the sale
is merely herere in corlice. See
also Downs v. Rickards, 4 Del.
Ch., 416.
In Texas and Missouri executors
and administrators are forbidden by
Statute to purchase the estate of
their decedents; but in South Carolina, after much fluctuation in the
courts, the right to purchase, at
any sale, was given them by an Act
of 1839, Ixi Stat., 94, the provisions
of which are incorporated in section a1974, Gen. Stat. The evil is
obviated somewhat by charging
them with the full value of the
property without reference to the
amount bid at the sale (Huger v.
Huger, 9 Rich. Eq., 217).
The exceptions so far noted are
partial, but there remains to be
considered an exception, which
embraces all classes of fiduciaries,
and which prevails in three States
South Carolina and
-Alabama,
Texas. A trustee, who is at the
same time beneficially interested
in the property which forms the
subject matter of the trust, can
purchase it at public sale, and his
title will be sustained. The only
effect of the fiduciary relation is
seen in the jealous care with which
the Court examines all the proceedings relative to the sale not satisfied until convincing proof is given
that it was fairly conducted and the
full price given. The reason assigned for this departure from the
rule, is that otherwise a trustee
would often be obliged to witness
the sacrifice of property which, in
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a sense, was already his own, and
besides, as in the case of family
property, he might wish to preserve it from the hands of strangers,
a sentiment in every way commendable and not to be discouraged
(Brannan v. Oliver, 2 Stew., 47;
Payne v. Turner, 36 Ala., 623;
Penny v. Jackson, 85 Ala., 67).
The same exception would probably be allowed in the case of a
preferred creditor, who accepts the
position of trustee for the payment
of debts, but not in a case where
the deed of trust provides for the
payment of the creditors ratably,
for it is then presumed that he has
waived his lien, and whatever he
does must enure to the benefit of
all (Harrison v. Mock, io Ala., 185).
In South Carolina this exception
does not extend to a trustee's purchase at his own sale, but there is
a strong inclination to apply it in
cases of judicial sales, conducted
by an officer of the Court (Anderson v. Butler, 31 S. C., 183).
Texas sides with Alabama. Certain property was transferred to a
creditor in trust to secure a loan,
and by the terms of the deed he
was given a power of sale. The
debt remaining unpaid, the trustee
exposed the property for sale at
public auction, and became the
purchaser. In a suit to set aside
the sale he proved his entire integrity, and the Court refused to
interfere (Scott v. Mann, 33 Tex.,
725; see also Bohn v. Davis, 75
Tex., 24).
Both in Texas and Alabama, however, this exception to a salutary.
rule is regretted by the Court, and
is only now allowed because long
established.
It may be advisable that a trustee
in such a condition should be allowed to purchase but there does

not seem to be any necessity for
making his case an exception. The
rule ought rather to be strictly enforced, and then upon application
to the Court by the trustee for leave
to purchase, the fact that he is
beneficially interested could be
judged sufficient reason for allowing him to bid. See Cadwalader's
App., 64 Pa., 293; Froneberger v.
Lewis, 79 N. C., 426, 435.
(c) The third class, in which is
numbered the principal case, also
comprises cases where the sale is
public, but with the difference that
the sale is instigated by creditors
and others whose interests are adverse to those of the cestui gut
trust.
In E nglandandgenerally through
out this country it has not been
considered that this fact puts the
trustee upon so altered a footing
that the rule should be relaxed for
his benefit. It has, on the contrary, been supposed that in such
cases there is afforded as much
opportunity to the trustee to betray
the interests of his cestui que trust
by a treacherous use of the information which he may have gained as
in cases where he is connected with
the conduct of the sale, The same
consequence, therefore, attends a
trustee's purchase here as in cases
where the sale is either his own or
ordered and conducted by a court
of equity in the interest of the
cestui que trust, the latter may, if
he chooses, avoid it. Or, as it has
been expressed, "a trustee who
holds the legal title for the use of
another will not be permitted to
deal with the property for his own
benefit, and it makes no difference
in his favor that he acquires it at a
judicial sale under a superior title:"
Roberts v. Mosley, 64 Mo., 207.
Wherever the question has arisen,

PURCHASES

BY TRUSTEES

with the exceptions already noted,
the universal rule is that no person
can be allowed to purchase an interest in property where he has a
duty to perform inconsistent with
the character of purchaser on his
own account. And in all the States,
except Pennsylvania, and, in the
case of administrators, Missouri, it
is considered that even at a sale
under adversary proceedings there
exists such an inconsistency. The
rule has been applied to an attorney, Cunningham v. Jones, 37 Kan.,
477; a commissioner of court,
Price's Admr. 7v. Thompson, 84
Ky., 219; creditor-assignees, Houston v. Crutchfield, 22 Ala., 76; Janes
v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal., 368;
Bellamy v. Bellamy, 6 Fla., 62, II4;
Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Me., 195;
King v. Remington, 36 Minn., 15;
administrators, Welch v. McGrath,
59 Iowa, 519; Dugas v. Gilbeau, 15
La. Ann., 581; Froneberger v.
Lewis, 79 N. C., 426; even where
the sale is made under execution
in their favor, issued before they
accepted the office, Martin v. Wyncoop, 12 Ind., 266; executor, Fleming 7. Foran, 12 Ga., 594; Marshall
v. Carson, 38 N. J. Eq., 2so; guardian, Downs v. Rickards, 4 Del. Ch.,
416; and to trustees proper, Wells
v. Francis, 7 Col., 396; Bell 7/.
Webb, 2 Gill., 163; Joor v. Williams, 38 Miss., 546; Roberts vz.
Mosely, 64 Mo., 507; Van Epps vi.
Van Epps, 9 Paige Ch., 237; Jewett
v'. Miller, IO N. Y., 402; Newcombe
v. Brooks, 16 W. Va., 32.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has again and again sanctioned the principle that a trustee
ought not to be permitted to place
himself in a position where he will
be subjected to a conflict between
duty and self-interest. But it has
at the same time insisted that at a

sale under adversary proceedings
there is no opportunity for selfinterest to tempt a trustee to fail in
his duty. The reason for this conclusion is given in Fisk v. Sarber,
6 W. and S., 18, where the question
was, whether the assignee of an insolvent debtor could purchase the
latter's property at a sherifPs sale
under a mortgage. The property
in question, part of that which had
been transferred, had been mortgaged to a certain bank, and the
interest was so far in arrears that it
was doubtful if the property would
bring enough to pay both principal
and interest. It was understood
between Fisk and the bank that if
he should be the highest bidder at
a price not less than $25o.oo below
the amount of the principal debt,
the bank would extend the time of
payment for five years and grant
other indulgences
At the sale
under the mortgage Fisk did bid in
the property, and it was decided
that his fiduciary character did not
prevent his becoming a valid purchaser. The property had been
taken out of the trustee's hands and
placed beyond his control and influence, so that he had no duty to
perfornn in regardto it.
The case was really decided on
the authority of a dictum in Prevost v. Gratz, i P. C. C. Rep., 364,
but the Court, per KENNEDY, J.,
justified the decision on the hypothesis that when the property of
the cestui que trust is in gremio
legis the trustee becomes functus
officio. This decision was followed
in Chorpenning's Appeal, 32 Pa.,
315, and Lusk's Appeal, 1O3 Pa.,
152, in the latter of which, however, the fact that the trustees were
purchasing to protect their own interests was strongly emphasized.
The freedom allowed by the re-
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laxation has been much limited by
two decisions which make it a condition of the validity of the trustee's title that he has not either allowed the sale, having other funds
of the estate in his hands or occa
sioned itby his act orprocurement.
Frank's App., r4 Pa., 531; Parshall's

App., 65 Pa.,

224.

Mullen v. Doyle is a still further
limitation in that it hampers the
trustee with the burden of disclosing to the cestui que trustall information which may fiossibly be of
use to him. Inasmuch as this course
rejects the hypothesis upon which
Fisk v. Sarber proceeded the authority of that case may be considered to be weakened to the point
of breaking.
The present position would seem
to be that taken by Tennessee,
namely, the real danger of abuse
lies in the control which the trustee
or other fiduciary may exercise over
the conduct of the sale. Relieve
him of this power and his attempts
to betray the interests of his cestui
que trust by using for his own benefit any information which he may
derive from his position as trustee
will invariably be detected.
In this class of cases Missouri
makes an exception in favor of administrators. At a foreclosure sale
made by order of the Circuit Court
an administrator purchased the
property of his decedent. It was
argued that the statute which forbids such purchases rendered his
title open to objection, but the
Court construed the statute to apply only to probate sales, nor was
the purchaser here in any sense a
fiduciary. An administrator has no
concern with or power of disposition over the real estate of his decedent, and to such a sale as this
having no duty to perform he came
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as a stranger. Dillinger v.Kelly,
84 M O., 261; Briant v.Jackson, 99
M ., 585. Where, however, the administrator is obliged bystatute, as
he is in Pennsylvania, if he finds
that the realty is to be taken for the
payment of debts, to have the proceedings stayed until he himself
can make the sale it is probable that
he would be considered a trustee
and his case would then be governed
by the rule applicable to trustees
purchasing at their own sales, for
there could be no sale under adver.
sary proceedings, Meanor v. Hamilton, 27 Pa., 137.
By way of general criticism it
may be said that in cases where the
purchaser occupies a position which
opens to him means of information
only thus accessible any exception
to the rule which closes the door to
temptation seems at variance with
the teachings of experience. The
duty of one who occupies such a
fiduciary position obliges him to
communicate all information and
exert all the care and industry necessary that the estate may be disposed of as advantageously as possible for the cestui que trust. It is
a dangerous delusion to believe that
it is within the power of a court of
equity to compel an unwilling trustee to disclose evidence of an unfaithfulness which is the secret of
his own heart. The trustee's connection with the sale is not the
main reason for the prohibition.
"What possible difference can it
make in reason and principle in
what manner or by whom the sale
is made of that which the trustee
holds when his duty in his trust relations is to make the property
bring its highest price in the protection of the interests of the cestui
que trust. His duty remains the
same; he stands concerned for the
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time being as would be the owner of
the property in appreciating it."
Marshall v. Carson, 38 N. J. Eq.
256. Any relaxation is poisonous in
its consequences.
To prohibit a
trustee from purchasing at his own
sale merely incites him the more to
bring about a sale by another. It
is only a substitution of temptations.
There are two cases which, perhaps, deserve mention for to the
extent to which dicta are authority
they are decisions in favor of the
trustee's right to purchase at a sale
underadversary proceedings. They
are, Barber v. Bowen, 47 Minn., 118,
and Allen v. Gillette, 127 U. S., 589.
In the former, an administrator
by order of court sold a part of the
property of his decedent in order to
discharge certain allowed claims.
The guardian of the decedent's
minor heirs became the purchaser.
The Court cited the few authorities
favoring the trustee's right to purchase at a public sale made by another, but the decision in favor of
the guardian rested on the circumstance that his fiduciary character
did not extend to the property in
question since it never was part of
the ward's estate, and obviously
never would be. In the latter case,
which came from Texas, an executor, who was also trustee of the estate of his testator in its entirety,
for a two-fold object, first, payment
of debts, and then the common benefit of all the heirs and devisees,
purchased the undivided share of
one of the latter. This share had
been mortgaged to secure a loan,
and was purchased at a sale in foreclosure of the mortgage. There are
dicta in the case in favor of the
trustee's right to purchase at a sale
under adversary proceedingst but
the decision in favor of the execu-

tors rested on a misapprehension of
the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Texas, "which are our guides in
this case." Those cited are cases
of purchases by mortgagees at foreclosure sales; and as had been
pointed out Texas makes these an
exception on the ground of beneficial interest in the purchaser.
There are, however, two methods
by which the trustee may acquire
an indefeasible title at public sale,
even when he is the vendor.
(i)He may by a new contract
with his cestui que trust divest him'self of the character of trustee, but
even that transaction will be
watched with infinite and the most
guarded jealousy since the Court
can never be sure that the trustee
when entering into the new contract has communicated to the cestui
que trust all the information which
as trustee he may have obtained.
Expare Lacey, 6 Ves., 325.
(2) He may file a bill asking for
leave of the Court to become a bidder, and in a proper case the Court
will give him permission. " But
the power is a delicate one and
should always be cautiously exercised, the sale itself being watched
with jealousy.' Dundas's App., 64
Pa., 325.
There is no good reason for the
difference which prevails on this,
so important a subject. All are
agreed that a trustee must not make
any profit from his administration
and the failure to insist upon a
rigid observance of the rule arises
from a misconception of its spirit.
"The rule is intended to secure
to the cestui que trust the chance of
any advantage," and it is the existence of this chance, however
doubtful, which precluqes the
trustee from retaining the property.
ROBERT P. BRADkORD.

